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I. THE BACKGROUND OF ENFORCEMENT-
EVOLVING PUBLIC ATTITUDES
The state of public awareness on environmental matters is one of
the critical elements in the evolving trend toward stricter and more uni-
form enforcement of environmental law. The growing public concern
about the environment in the 1960's and through the 1970's prompted
varied governmental action designed to ensure more thorough consid-
eration of environmental risks as well as Wore stringent enforcement in
the area.'
Underlying the post-World War II concern with all forms of envi-
ronmental degradation is the massive growth in production and the
availability of both public and private resources which provide the po-
tential for dealing effectively with environmental problems. Once gov-
ernment has embarked on environmental programs of one sort or
another, the momentum thereby established tends to create even
greater public demand for further action and further enforcement.
Once an official environmental body is created, that agency becomes
the focal point for bringing environmental issues to the attention of the
general public as well as of other government officials.
A much higher degree of sophistication and commitment on the
* The author expresses appreciation to the Fund for Environmental Studies for
financial assistance in research leading to this article. The views expressed are those of the
author.
1. See, ag., Message of the President Accompanying Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 42
U.S.C. § 4321 at 1727 (1976) (statement of reasons for creation of Environmental Protection
Agency: "[intensified] concern with the condition of our physical cnvironment").
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part of government to do something about the environmental issues of
the day is the net result of this process. Private and public interest
groups concerned with environmental affairs continue to call for action
and this in turn strengthens the hand of the governmental unit. This
public concern with environment thus becomes institutionalized and
the pressure to properly carry out the law becomes a constant. These
evolving attitudes are discernable in the increased intervention by pub-
lic organizations in matters of environmental concern.2
The following sections of this Article will briefly survey and ana-
lyze the characteristics of the various enforcement authorities, the
forms of enforcement and classification of enforcement schemes in the
United States and several Western European jurisdictions and will
close with some observations on perceptible trends. The survey of vari-
ous jurisdictions treats the European Economic Community (EEC) as a
jurisdiction separate and distinct from its constituent parts. Particular
jurisdictions have been selected for their representativeness of the civil
law, common law, or germanic law system.
II. THE ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES-AN
OVERVIEW
No law is better than its enforcement scheme. It is also true that
the first and most important step in establishing a compliance system is
to determine the appropriate type of administrative structure which
will carry out and monitor that system. This initial determination will
in practice have a significant impact on the level and effectiveness of
compliance. There are three distinct types of enforcement structures: a
branch exclusively concerned with environmental protection; a branch
specifically concerned with the substantive form of environmental deg-
radation in question; and a branch having overall responsibility for co-
ordinating environmental standards and compliance.
The first structure is one in which the controls over environmental
quality and compliance are delegated to an administrative unit exclu-
sively concerned with environmental protection. Such a unit may take
the form of a government department or ministerial portfolio or some
other quasi-autonomous agency. A prime example of this type of struc-
ture is found in the United States. The National Environmental Policy
2. See, e.g., Roberts & Stewart, Book Review, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1644, 1656 (1975)
("environmental organizations had. . . convince[d] many elected officials by the late 1960's
that they were a 'swing' constituency to be taken seriously").
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Act3 (NEPA) mandated that federal agencies consider the environmen-
tal consequences of their actions and the environmental consequences
of actions they fund or license. The Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ) was established under Title II of the Act and linked with the
Executive Office of the President. It monitors and formulates environ-
mental policy. It also advises and consults directly with the President.
The Environmental Protection Agency4 (EPA) is responsible for carry-
ing out environmental policies, and assists the CEQ in developing and
recommending to the President new policies for the protection of the
environment. The EPA is an independent regulatory agency concerned
only with environmental matters. It has no other governmental func-
tions. NEPA is silent on enforcement of its provisions. According to
the legislative background, it was originally contemplated that the Of-
fice of Management and Budget (OMB) would enforce the Act and
monitor the Environmental Impact Statement procedures.5 While
there is no single agency -in the federal government having overall re-
sponsibility for environmental control and compliance, the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) is the closest analogue to an enforce-
ment agency. However, since its powers are merely consultative and
admonitory, it cannot compel compliance with NEPA.6 Although no
enforcement agency exists to guarantee compliance with the Act, the
courts have taken it upon themselves to ensure that agencies comply
with the NEPA provisions, in particular those provisions which relate
to impact statements.7
Within the European Economic Community (EEC), a second ex-
ample of this administrative structure is found in Denmark. Danish
environmental matters are dealt with by a tripartite administrative
structure, consisting of the Ministry of the Environment, the Director-
ate of the Environment and the independent Environmental Appeal
3. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970). For the full text and analysis of the act, see F.
ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS-A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMEN-
TAL POLICY AcT (1973).
4. Established pursuant to Reorg. Plan No. 3 as an independent agency in the Execu-
tive Branch (Dec. 2, 1970). 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976).
5. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at § 4 of the Act.
6. Shortly after NEPA's passage, Executive Order 11514 was issued, making CEQ re-
sponsible for issuing guidelines to federal agencies, for the preparation of detailed state-
ments on proposals for legislation, and other federal actions affecting the environment, as
required by § 102(2)(C) (Exec. Order No. 11514, sec. 3(h), 35 Red. Reg. 4247 (1970).
7. See, ag., Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d
1109; Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 165 (D.D.C. 1971), 337 F.
Supp. 167 (D.C.C. 1971), motionfor summary reyersal denied, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C.C. 1972),
dismissed as moot, 337 F. Supp. 170 (D.D.C. 1972).
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Board. The Ministry and the Directorate, with the Ministry in charge,
have a broad range of duties, while the Appeal Board is the superior
administrative agency. The Ministry is only partially concerned with
environmental matters; it also deals with matters such as urban and
rural planning and nature conservation. The Ministry, nevertheless,
has a very broad legislative mandate with its enforcement authority. It
is authorized to issue regulations8 and thus has significant power to
control agency as well as individual actions in the environmental area.
Further, the Ministry has basic authority in several fields to issue sub-
stantive decisions 9 and possesses additional authority to intervene in
substantive actions by lower level agencies or agency decisions taken in
individual actions.' 0
The Directorate as a unit comes under the Ministry but, in contra-
distinction to it, deals solely with environmental protection. While
subordinate to the Ministry, the Directorate's field of operations and
environmental expertise is quite broad. The Directorate advises the
Ministry on its functions." In addition, the Directorate advises local
agencies and agencies other than the Ministry;' 2 exercises delegated
Ministry functions including issuance of intake/discharge guidelines;' 3
receives appeals against local agency decisions' 4 and acts as a public
information agency for environmental matters.
The second administrative structure of a compliance system is one
in which the competence for controls is assigned to that public agency
whose field of operations is most closely associated with the particular
form of environmental degradation. The work may be associated in
the sense that it is negatively affected by a given type of environmental
degradation, e.g, the work of the health agency; or it may be associated
in that it actually tends to create environmental problems, e.g., the
work of the transport or energy development agency. In several juris-
dictions where this sort of structure is utilized, various central govern-
ment departments exercise environmental control powers. Regional
and local conventional public agencies, usually multi-sectoral units, si-
multaneously exercise controls either autonomously and in accordance
8. Environmental Protection Act of 13 June 1973, No. 372, Lov., Part A, 2, 18 July
1973, No. 34 at 1088 et seq. (Entry into force 1 October 1974).
9. Id., art. 11.
10. Id., arts. 38, 47, 57, 70 (2-3).
11. Id., art. 45 (1-2).
12. Id., art. 45(l).
13. Order of 29 March 1974, No. 175 on the Assignment of Tasks and Powers to the
Environment Board, Lov., 18 April 1974, No. 20, at 444 et seq.
14. Environmental Protection Act, art. 70(1).
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with central government policy, or directly under central government
supervision.
In many jurisdictions with the second type of administrative struc-
ture, there are numerous agencies which share some interest or respon-
sibility for the problem. An illustration of this division of enforcement
responsibility is found in Italy.
Several Italian government offices or central public agencies have
powers of environmental control of either a supervisory, administra-
tive, or executive nature.1 5 The division and overlap of environmental
competences and organizational inconsistencies associated therewith
reflect the lively debate in environmental circles on the role of central
government and reflect on the nature of the interaction between the
agencies and the central administrative apparatus. 16 The sectoral ap-
proach in this instance translates into at least thirteen ministries having
some interest in environmental control. These include, inter alia:
Health, which is concerned with public hygiene and safeguarding
against pollution; 7 Public Works, which manages public water supply,
planning and land conservation;"3 Industry, which is responsible for
the management of natural resources; 19 Transport and Civil Aviation,
which is responsible for the environmental ramifications of surface and
air transport; Merchant Marine, which is charged with maritime mat-
ters; Agriculture and Forestry, which is responsible for agricultural ac-
tivities and pollution control;20 Environment, which is responsible for
researching environmental issues.2'
The structure of environmental control in Ireland is another exam-
ple of this type of sectoral approach. No single Irish government
agency has overall responsibility for environmental protection. Com-
pliance duties are shared among several government departments and
coordination is ensured through informal liaison committees and ex-
15. Decreto del Presidente della Republica, Jan. 14, 1972, No. I in Gaz. Uff., I semes-
tre, 1972, Roma. This order assigns control over health functions to the various regional
governments. See Law No. 296, March 13, 1958, establishing the Ministry of Health.
16. 7 P. DELL 'ANNO, THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO POLLUTION CONTROL IN
ITALY 12 (1976).
17. Decreto del Presidente della Republica, Jan. 14, 1972, No. 4, art. 6, 1 Gaz. Uff. 215
(1972).
18. Decreto del Presidente della Republica, Jan. 14, 1972, No. 8, arts. 8, 9; 8 Gaz. Uff.
357 (1972).
19. Law No. 443, June 4, 1973, 1 Gaz. Uff. 1223 (1973).
20. Decreto del Presidente del Repubica, Jan. 15, 1972, No. 11, art. 4, 1 Gaz. Uff. 422
(1972), including National Parks and Forestry Corps.
21. 7 P. DELL 'ANNO, supra note 16, at 13.
No. 2]
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changes.22 The Department of Local Government has general respon-
sibility for air and water pollution, oil pollution of coastal areas,
development planning and has special sections dealing specifically with
environmental and sanitary services. It is the key agency for environ-
mental affairs. Other departments which deal with environmental
problems include: Transport and Power, which has responsibility for
transportation and energy, oil pollution of the sea, tourism, etc.; Agri-
culture and Fisheries, which has responsibility for agricultural control
and fishery conservation; Industry and Commerce, which supervises
prospecting licenses and mineral leases, and has responsibility for in-
dustrial development; Health, which has responsibility for environmen-
tal hygiene and supervising health boards; and Lands, which has
responsibility for pollution impact on wildlife and forest development,
In addition, there are regional and local authorities which have territo-
rially limited jurisdiction in subject matters areas roughly correspond-
ing to those of the central administration.
The third structure is a hybrid of the first two structures. In this
structure, one branch has overall responsibility for coordinating envi-
ronmental standards and enforcements. Such structures exist in France
and the United Kingdom where central government authorities coordi-
nate and promote environmental protection. Both countries have re-
gional offices involved in environmental control which have original
jurisdiction rather than delegated jurisdiction. The offices are subject,
however, to central government supervision.
The distinct advantage of the various sectoral approaches is that
those agencies most intimately associated with the subject matter of
their environmental jurisdiction presumably have the knowledge and
expertise to deal with it. The organizational confusion which prevails
in these structures is to some extent typical of any multi-sectoral prob-
lem area confronted by central or regional government. Such organiza-
tional inconsistencies are also, in part, a reflection of rapid growth and
change in the environmental field. The almost continual search for an
organizational niche for noise pollution control or coastal zone man-
agement is a good example of administrative problems created by new
issues or new ways of approaching old issues. A pervasive difficulty is
that the lack of any single definition of the goals and nature of environ-
mental control encourages many agencies to view one or another form
of environmental degradation as within their authority. Proposals to
22. See, e.g., Report of Water Pollution, Prl. 2939 (1972). See S. EREMAN, EUROPEAN
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 78 (1977).
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unify the different types of environmental control generally meet with
little success.
There are no easy answers to the problems raised by the multitude
of agencies and administrative departments in the environmental con-
trol field. The problems reflect the various approaches taken on envi-
ronmental issues in industralized, urban societies, and the more
particular complexities of environmental quality itself.
1I. FORM OF ENFORCEMENT: ENFORCEMENT
FACTORS
The selection of a given form or technique of enforcement will
necessarily depend on the characteristics of the specific environmental
situation. One could refer to these characteristics as "enforcement fac-
tors." These factors tend in some way to favor a particular kind or
degree of enforcement in each distinct factual context.
First and foremost among these enforcement factors is the type
and degree of environmental degradation involved. There is no set
pattern among the various jurisdictions with respect to this element. A
general rule is that the severity of enforcement will vary in accordance
with the perceived environmental priorities as well as with the peculiar
local needs in a given jurisdiction. An example is found in the environ-
mental control system of California. Although responsibility for con-
trolling many types of pollution has beem preempted by the federal
government,' the United States political system offers several ways for
local jurisdictions, whether municipalities or states, to articulate the in-
tensity and direction of their preferences. In California, due to a rela-
tively unevolved mass transportation system, the phenomenally
intensive use of automobiles and the local geographic conditions, 24
state government has imposed vehicle emission standards which are
stricter than the corresponding federal standards.25 Enforcement of
those standards is quite strict.26
23. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 etseq. (1970); Water Quality
Improvement Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321 et seq. (1970); Resource Recovery Act of 1970, 42
U.S.C. §§ 3251 etseq. (1970); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970,42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 elseq.
(1972); Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. (1972); Noise
Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4901 (1972); Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act
of 1972, 7 U.S.C. § 135 et seq. (1972).
24. E.g., the inversion in the Los Angeles region giving rise to air quality deterioration
by a reversal of the normal atmospheric temperature gradient.
25. 13 Cal. Ad. Code §§ 2210 et seq. (1979).
26. See, eg., .4merican Motors, California Agency gree [sic] on £1.1.4Aillion FiTne Settle-
ment, [1976] 7 ENVT'L REP. 1103 (BNA).
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Some types of environmental degradation, either because of the
complexity of the subject matter or the difficulty in enforcement, may
require a special mix of compliance strategies. In the area of noise
abatement enforcement, for instance, the strategy of the United States
federal government for enforcement of new product noise control regu-
lations consists of a three-pronged approach: product verification, se-
lective enforcement auditing (SEA), and in-use controls.27 The
interesting aspect of this enforcement scheme is the SEA feature which
involves the testing by a manufacturer or the Environmental Protection
Agency, pursuant to an administrative request, of a statistical sample of
products from a particular category or configuration. Testing would
determine whether those products conform to the noise standards and
provides the basis for further enforcement actions, such as recall and
cease-to-distribute orders, if non-conformity exists.28 The Noise Con-
trol Actl specifies that any person who knowingly or willfully distrib-
utes in commerce a regulated new product not conforming with the
new product regulations is subject to a fine of not more than $25,000
per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or
both.29 A similar, though less stringent set of enforcement strategies
may be found in the area of water and air quality control in the Euro-
pean Economic Community. Since permanent monitoring is prohibi-
tive because of cost and manpower requirements, some member states
require industry to monitor its own discharges. Here again, several ad-
ministrations utilize the periodic sampling technique to obtain data on
violations.30
A second enforcement factor is the complexity of the technology
necessary to abate the pollution problem. Many kinds of environmen-
tal deterioration can be brought under control using existing technol-
ogy. However, the cost of that technology is often prohibitive. Another
problem is determining whether the state of the art of that technology is
sufficiently developed to be economically reasonable. Legislative dead-
lines for achieving specific standards may be perceived as necessary to
prevent further deterioration, but care should be exercised that such
deadlines are realistic and thus enforceable. Unrealistic "forcing" of
technology by legislation designed to influence its development may
unwittingly result in falsely arousing public expectations and locking-in
27. See Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901 et seq. (1972).
28. See generally Winder, Peace and Quiet in Our Time-the U.S. Federal Noise Contirol
Act, 2 ENVT'L PoL'Y & L. 130 (1970).
29. Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4910 (1972).
30. Eg., United Kingdom. See S. EREMAN, supra note 22, at 171.
[Vol. 3
Comparative Environmental Enforcement Mechanisms
legislators politically. The offshoot of this process results in the law
being enforced unevenly or not at all when a deadline arrives. Even
where deadline provisions are not part of legislation or regulation,
measures should be included to provide for the progressive adaptation
of technical advancements as they develop so that attainable progress is
not unnecessarily postponed.
There is controversy over the advisability of uniform statutorily
enforceable standards, such as those which have been proposed by the
European Economic Community. Opponents of these uniform stan-
dards consider it impractical or unfair to push the state of the art too
far ahead of its time by the vehicle of technology-forcing legislation.
By way of example, they argue that industrial emissions should be
based on the principle of "best practical means."' 3 1 This implies that
government should establish guidelines in the form of a band, with a
maximum indicating levels above which there is a need for immediate
action, and a minimum below which action is probably not worthwhile.
Such guidelines would, however, presumably have no statutory force.32
Present statutory or administrative standards in at least several
Western European jurisdictions reflect a flexible, experimental ap-
proach to environmental enforcement and controls. In the Federal Re-
public of Germany, for example, most emission and immission
enforcement standards are regulatory in nature.3 3 Such administrative
controls, while binding on the enforcement authorities, are nevertheless
subject to judicial standard-setting where the reasonableness of the
standards is challenged.34
In France, recent legislation35 designed to control stationary
sources of pollutants subjects such sources to authorization by the local
prefect. The operator of the facility applies for authorization at the
time an application is made for a construction permit. The prefect
may, at its discretion, order time-dependent control measures. The
prefect, in addition, has broad powers to enforce compliance with its
standards where the facility has not complied within stated time lim-
31. See, ag., Air Follution Control An Integrated Approach, RaAp! Contiuson on Envi-
ronmental Pollution 5th Rep. (HMSO) (1976).
32. See, ag., Royal Commission Proposes New Pollution Insperlorate, 69 NEw SciEN-
TIST 165 (1976).
33. See Federal Emissions Protection Act § 48 BImSchG (Allgemcine Vcrwaltungsvor-
schrift).
34. See Gutachten zur Gesanthelastung der Jirtschaft, MATERALIEN ZUhM UtWELT-
PROGRAMM DER BUNDESREGIERUNG zu DRUCKSACHE VI/2170 at 614.
35. Act Relating to Establishments Classified for the Protection of the Environment
(Loi sur les Etablissements Classes), 19 July 1976, No. 76-663 [1976], J.O. 4320 etseq.
No. 21
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its.36 Thus administrative action is the prefect's prerogative. Adminis-
trative controls may be made more or less burdensome depending upon
the nature of the particular operations.
The system introduced by the German Federal Emissions Protec-
tion Act37 suggests a variety of flexible standard-setting approaches
along with specific technology-forcing requirements in specific in-
stances. The system introduced by the French Classified Establish-
ments legislation3" suggests a similar, two-tiered standard-setting
approach for activities that fall within and without the various classifi-
cations. As classifications may be revised from time to time and are
subject to broad administrative interpretation, technology-forcing is
counter-balanced by the administrative authorities' perception of the
seriousness of the deleterious industrial activity and, presumably, by
constantly changing local conditions.
A third enforcement factor is the nature of the polluter, individual
or corporate, and the economic power of the polluter. As a particular
industry gets larger, so too do the possibilities of using a series of en-
forcement measures to ensure ultimate compliance. A rather small en-
terprise has less maneuvering room in terms of the resources available
to it to quickly meet compliance demands. Government attempts to
enforce deadlines and timetables for various types of environmental
control or small enterprises often fail. On the other hand, with larger
firms, government can exert its enforcement powers with greater flex-
ibility and, significantly, with greater economy and efficiency. For ex-
ample, as a warning to industrial polluters the United States
Environmental Protection Agency has "listed" a large enterprise for
"continuing or recurring noncompliance with water standards" at its
facilities.39 The effect of the listing, which was the first under federal
water pollution control regulations, is to exclude the facility from using
"any new, renewed or extended federal contract, subcontract, grant,
subgrant, loan or subloan, which amount exceeds $100,000.''40
A fourth category of enforcement factors includes the economic
36. Id., chapt. VII, art. 23.
37. Supra note 28.
38. Supra note 30.
39. Del Monte de Puerto Rico, Inc., a subsidiary of Del Monte Corporation, and Star-
Kist Caribe, Inc. This listing resulted because of continued violations of a timetable for
construction or submission of plans for compliance that would make the facility eligible for
a new National Pollution Discharge Elimination System Permit. Authority for the listing
procedure is derived from Sec. 309(c) of the Clean Water Act of 1972, as amended (1977).
40. See, As a Warning to Industrial Polluters, 18 WATER NI:WSLEITER 22 (Nov. 30,
1976).
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and social ramifications of enforcing pollution controls. Insuring envi-
ronmental quality has become a major issue of public policy. Control
of the environment is the responsibility of government, since the pri-
vate sector is inadequate to deal with the costs and benefits of environ-
mental degradation. This is so because many types of degradation and
pollution are what economists call "externalities." The costs of pollu-
tion, for example, usually are not paid for by the polluter. Similarly,
the benefits of controlling pollution do not accrue solely or even prima-
rily to the person or entity that institutes the control measures. The
only way in which these costs and benefits can be sensibly allocated is
through a form of political action, and the unique vehicle through
which it can be carried out is government. In many instances, the
money and the technology are presently available to control strictly
most of the environmental pollutants about which we have some
knowledge.
A potentially serious conflict exists between economic develop-
ment and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations.4' There
also exists the inevitable conflict between those large enterprises subject
to enforcement and the enforcement authorities. The underlying ten-
sion between the regulated and the regulators is a natural and foresee-
able phenomenon. The tension is easily exacerbated by the sometimes
extreme positions taken by both government and regulated entities.
The variances between the spirit and letter of the law and its en-
forcement have been frequently placed under the general rubric "im-
plementation gaps," taken to mean lax enforcement in the
environmental regulatory area.42 These implementation gaps usually
relate to critical problems in enforcement tied to financial and eco-
nomic considerations, scientific and technical difficulties, and the extent
of power to be granted administrative authorities as these relate to the
assessment and imposition of penalties for environmental damage.
Apart from these types of implementation gaps, there are other
problems such as the inadequate bureaucratic experience and the legis-
lative and administrative structure in many jurisdictions.
41. See, ag., Interview with Maurice F. Strong (July 13, 1976), 2 ENWr'L Po.'Y & L 66,
68 (1976).
42. See, eg., Vitzthum, The Fourth International Parliamentary Conference on the Envi-
ronment: A Summary Report, 2 ENVT'L PoL'Y & L. 66, 68 (1976).
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IV. CLASSIFICATION OF ENFORCEMENT
MECHANISMS
While there is a fair amount of overlap in the use of one or more
enforcement mechanisms, it is possible to broadly draw the following
five categories: (1) civil remedies, (2) criminal sanctions or penalties,
(3) administrative quasi-judicial measures, (4) fiscal measures and (5)
voluntary restraints. The civil remedies and administrative measures
constitute the more traditional processes.
Civil remedies comprehend the entire range of compensatory and
injunctive remedies known to both the common law and civil law sys-
tems. Such actions are ordinarily brought by individuals and, more
recently, by various environmental associations, for a specific loss or
damage suffered. As a practical matter, enforcement of environmental
law through the vehicle of the private civil suit has never been a viable
remedy and probably will not be such in the foreseeable future. At
best, the private lawsuit approach as a means of ensuring environmen-
tal enforcement has been haphazard or uncertain. First, the individual
plaintiff must have a specific interest or sufficient monetary or nuisance
value to justify his cause of action. Second, many types of environmen-
tal interests will not ordinarily be vindicated by individual plaintiffs
since a private interest will not necessarily correspond with a more gen-
eral public interest. The remedy of abatement, a common law remedy
which allows a party injured by a private nuisance to destroy or remove
the nuisance at his own instance, may be one of the most widely used
vehicles among the common law remedies for individual plaintiffs.4 3
While it is true that environmental organizations, representing a
broader public interest, are seeking to increase the effectiveness of their
role in environmental defense, by taking their arguments to court, it is
also true that narrowly drawn standing requirements in various juris-
dictions may effectively operate as a bar to the assertion of otherwise
legitimate claims. While the standing to sue requirements may vary
significantly from one jurisdiction to another, it is nevertheless a basic
requirement everywhere that a court must be reasonably satisfied that a
given association plaintiff is a proper party to assert a particular
claim.' 4 The class action mechanism, generally designed for those in-
stances when it would be impractical to achieve comparatively small
43. W. PROSSER, TORTS 605, 606 (4th ed. 1971).
44. On the position of public interest organizations in the United States, see Gregory,
Standing to Sue in Environmental Litigation in the United States o/Amerlca, 1UCN ENVT'L
POL'Y & L., PAPER, No. 2 (1972).
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recovery in numerous lawsuits, has similar restraints associated with
the proper identification and the representativeness of the class.4 s Even
where the class action constitutes a theoretically viable approach in
vindicating environmental interests, courts have recently made use of
this type of judicial access device much more difficult.46 In addition, in
many jurisdictions the class action is unknown.4i 7
Administrative measures include the whole panopoly of govern-
mental requirements which directly or indirectly ensure compliance
with environmental regulation. Where the legislative basis covers a
sufficiently broad range of activity, administrative measures constitute
one of the mainstays of environmental enforcement. However, admin-
istrative measures are effective only when they are evenly and equita-
bly applied.
The most basic type of administrative device is the permit process,
including authorization procedures, suspension or closure. A very sig-
nificant piece of recent coastal zone legislation in the State of Califor-
nia has, at its enforcement nucleus, a permit process which implements
the law.48 Government may also enforce its mandates by means of the
controls exercised by administrative authorities over the provision of
grants to publicly or privately operated treatment or processing facili-
ties.
Other financial controls exercised by administrative bodies include
strict loan requirements, loan approvals, research or pilot project al-
lowances, and special terms and conditions in government contracts.4 9
Preferential purchasing by public entities is yet another administrative
mode of exacting compliance with environmental regulation.50
Criminal sanctions and interrelated civil penalties in the environ-
mental enforcement context have been the subject of much contro-
versy.51 Civil penalties may be distinguished from criminal penalties in
45. See generally Mosk, Finding a Direction for Our Environment, 3 BARRIuSTER at 16
(Spring 1976).
46. Each plaintiff in a class action must satisfy the S10,000 jurisdictional amount to
maintain the action under federal rule 23(b)(3). Any plaintiff who does not satisfy it must be
dismissed from the case. Zahn v. International Paper Company, 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1972).
47. Eg., Australia. The Australian legal system does not provide for class actions. An-
other inhibiting feature of the law is that the losing party usually pays court costs and the
legal costs of the opponent. Davies, Updating Civil Court Procedures for the 80's, 49 AusT..
LJ. 380, 385 (1975).
48. See Zalob, The Calfornia Coastal Plan. A Summary Report, 2 ENvr'L POL'Y & L
23, 26 (1976).
49. Eg., compliance with water quality standards, noise emission control, etc.
50. E.g., purchase of fuel-saving vehicles or quieter engines.
51. See Kovel, A Casefor CivilPenalies: Air Pollution Control, 46 J. URB. L 153 (1969)
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that although the former may have an element of punishment for an
injury or wrong done, they lack an important feature of criminal pun-
ishment: the possibility of imprisonment and establishment of a crimi-
nal record in that regard. The criminal sanction, in environmental
control as in other areas, purports to force compliance through both the
threat of imprisonment and the social stigma of the criminal label.
However, because many criminal52 penalty provisions provide for a
fine and/or imprisonment of a convicted violator, an accused may fre-
quently receive no more than a fine.
Penal sanctions are, by their nature, discretionary in degree. Thus
criminal sanctions for environmental violations produce uncertain re-
sults which are no more consistent than the results reached in civil pro-
ceedings. However, if regulatory controls or licensing systems are
backed by criminal penalties which are usually applied at the initiative
of public agencies, there is a much better chance for consistency in en-
forcement and specific result.
In the context of cnvironmental law, criminal sanctions exist in
various forms. A brief overview will serve to indicate what types of
conduct are proscribed under various laws. First, criminal provisions
may involve the violation of authority orders or directives, where the
pertinent legislation has delegated a broad range of powers to an envi-
ronmental unit. Thus, an authority may issue an order prohibiting
construction, installation or establishment of an air containment source
which does not meet air quality regulations promulgated by the author-
ity. It is important to note that criminal penalties in this area do not
attach to conduct other than willful violation5 3 of an authority order.54
(strongly opposing the use of the criminal sanction in the area of air pollution control, in
that past application of the sanction has proven ineffective in controlling air pollution);
Glenn, The Crime of 'Pollution' The Role of Federal Water Pollution Criminal Sanctions,
11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 835 (1973) (strongly in favor of the criminal sanction as a means for
controlling water pollution). Cf. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Crintinal Sanc-
ions in Enforcing Economic Regulation, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423 (1963),
52. See H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 35-36 (1968),
53. In Anglo-American jurisdictions, "[The word 'willful'. . . is elastic and is of some-
what varied signification according to the context in which it is found and the nature of the
subject matter to which it refers." At times it may mean no more than a willingness to do
the particular deed, but in certain connections it has been held to mean "not merely 'volun-
tary,' but with a bad purpose." Its import in one case was given as "corruptly, with fraudu-
lent intent, designedly and with improper motives." "[Tlhe requirement often imposed
because of the use of the word 'wilful' [is) that the act be done, not only with an evil intent,
but also 'without reasonable grounds for believing the act to be lawful.'" (Citations omit-
ted.) R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 933 (2d ed. 1969).
54. E.g., the Ontario (Canada).Ministry of the Environment in mid-1975 issued a clean-
up order under Section 43 of the Environmental Protection Act, ordering a firm to properly
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A similar type of criminal provision may directly prohibit a narrowly
defined type of environmental degradation or conduct such as a partic-
ular kind of pollution. These provisions may take the shape of regula-
tions issued by an authority or, alternatively, specific statutory
prohibitions drafted by the legislature itself."5 Legislative provisions
may, however, also include specific prohibitions which do not require
willfulness as an element of the environmental violation; once the pro-
hibited act occurs, even if unintentionally, strict criminal liability at-
taches. 6
Another category of criminal prohibitions may consist of a single
"universal" provisions which broadly proscribes environmental degra-
dation or pollution in general, as opposed to narrowly defined prohibi-
cover a landfill site. The company defied the order and a S10,000 fine was levied, then the
highest fine ever obtained by the Ministry. Or. REv. STAT. ch. 8b, § 4.3 (1952).
55. E.g., under the United States Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), 42
U.S.C. § 6201 (1977), stiff penalties were imposed on violators of Federal Energy Adminis-
tration (FEA) pricing and allocation regulations following new rules announced in 1976 by
the agency. Under the act, maximum civil penalties were increased as high as $20,000 per
violation. Criminal penalties of up to $40,000 plus one year in prison may be imposed for
certain categories of violations committed since the law was enacted December 22, 1975.
Before adoption of EPCA, FEA regulations did not provide for imprisonment, and fines
were limited to $2,500 for civil violations-limitations which had been adopted from the
Economic Stabilization Act of 1970. Under EPCA, three categories of violators are set up.
Activities involving crude oil production, distribution and refining are subject to the $20,000
and $40,000 civil and criminal penalty limitations. Activities involving refined petroleum
products and residual fuel oil (except at the retail level) have maximum penalties of S10,000
(civil) and $20,000 (criminal), and retail-level violations have S2,500 (civil) and S10,000
(criminal) maximums. Prison sentences of up to one year may be imposed either in lieu of,
or in addition to, fines for willful violations. Finally penalties may be assessed against "di-
rectors, officers or agents" of corporations for their willful participation in unlawful corpo-
rate activities but limits imprisonment of such persons to instances where they had prior
FEA notification of the corporation's violations.
56. "[L]egislatures... have often undertaken to impose criminal liability for conduct
unaccompanied by fault. A statute may simply provide that whoever does (or omits to do)
so-and-so, or whoever brings about such-and-such a result, is guilty of a crime, setting forth
the punishment." LAFAVE & Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 218 (1972). Three
such specific, "strict liability" prohibitions appear in the Alaska (United States) Environ-
mental Conservation Act of 1971. Under Alaska Statute § 46.03.730, certain pesticide appli-
cations which may endanger health, welfare, property or the environment are prohibited,
unless prior department authorization is obtained. Under Alaska Statute § 46.03.740, dis-
charges of a petroleum product are forbidden unless a department regulation specifically
permits or unless permitted under a specified international agreement. Under Alaska Stat-
ute § 46.03.750(a), pollution of state waters by the discharge of ballast or waste water from
ships in excess of department-established water quality standards is prohibited. A violation
of any one of these three provisions is punishable by a maximum $25,000 fine and/or one
year imprisonment per offense. ALAsKA STAT. § 46.03.760(a) (1971). Further, each "act"
which constitutes a violation (and not each day of a continuing violation) is punishable as a
separate and distinct offense. ALAsKA STAT. § 46.03.760(a) (1971).
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tions. Usually, willful intent to violate this type of provision is
unnecessary to secure conviction: a violation here is generally a "strict
liability" offense, punishable by a fine and/or imprisonment. This
genre of statute is relatively new. It is generally not in force in Western
European jurisdictions but can be found in several American states.5"
These statutes, extremely broad as they are, frequently obviate the need
for prosecution under the more specific statutory provisions inasmuch
as most types of pollution will come within their purview.
The application of the various criminal provisions described above
in the corporate setting will vary greatly in different jurisdictions. For
example, despite the fact that commercial waste represents a key envi-
ronmentally deleterious factor and, despite the existence of criminal
provisions to counter this pollution source, the criminal sanction has
only infrequently been put to use.58 A principal problem in this regard
has been the inability or, alternatively, the unwillingness of enforce-
ment agencies to isolate and charge high corporate officers for a partic-
ular environmental crime. There is a similar hesitation to charge an
employee who may have no policy-making responsibility in the corpo-
ration. 59 Additionally, problems arise in ascertaining culpability when
the management of the firm is complex and when decision making is
fragmented and decentralized. While simply being a corporate official
is generally not enough to invoke criminal liability, it is clear that if the
officer "participated" in criminal behavior in some significant manner
he should be held liable in most instances.
Thus criminal enforcement in the environmental field operates at a
secondary level to administrative and preventative sanctions which are
designed to abate new sources of pollution and to regulate pre-existing
industries by the issuance and withdrawal of licenses and permits. The
57. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-1506(a) (1971), NEB. REV. STAT, § 81-1506(a) (Cum,
Supp. 1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. §403.121(l)(a) (West 1973); ALASKA STAT. §46.03.710
(1971). These statutes contain words to the effect that no person shall pollute or add to the
pollution of the air, land, or water of the state (e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.710 (1971)),
58. Generally, Western European legislation adheres to the principle that only "natural
persons" as opposed to "legal persons," i e., corporations or other statutorily created entities,
are subject to criminal liability. In Denmark and the United Kingdom, a "legal person" is
recognized for purposes of criminal liability. Legislation is being considered in Switzerland
and France which would recognize legal persons in criminal matters. S. EREMAN, EuRo-
PEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 487 (1977). Criminal enforcement in the form of indictments
against corporate entities is a well settled practice in the United States. See, e.g., United
States v. Velsicol Chemical Corporation, No. C-75-462 (Tenn. Nov. 10, 1976), [1976] 9 EN-
VIR. REP. CASES 1723 (BNA).
59. For some background on the situation in France (tending to pinpoint penal respon-
sibility on officers) and the U.K. (tending to be less strict) see Should the Boss Go to Jail, 69
NEW SCIENTIST 347 (1976).
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criminal sanction constitutes a supplemental remedy intended by most
jurisdictions to augment rather than supplant either civil or administra-
tive enforcement mechanisms. In Western European jurisdictions,
preference has been shown for the traditional per diem or flat fine for
proscribed activity. In some jurisdictions, the administrative penalty is
legislatively combined with incarceration penalties. This is the case
under Germany's Federal Environmental Protection Act (1974) and
the Belgium Act on Protection of Surface Waters (1971), in both of
which prison sentences are made available along with the usual admin-
istrative sanction of fines. The trend in Western Europe is to more
stringent custodial penalties and experimentation with new criminal
penalty approaches. These include renewed examination of the desira-
bility of introducing corporate criminal liability and criminalization of
environmental negligence. Also under consideration are new procedu-
ral devices, including special courts and prosecutors, intervention by
community organizations in legal proceedings, maintenance of a "crim-
inal register" of polluting businesses, and elimination of amnesty for
serious offenses.60
A perceptible trend has developed in recent years to employ
financial measures and more particularly tax measures as instruments
to enforce environmental law and regulation. Fiscal measures serve
many purposes including the generating of revenue to defray the ad-
ministrative expenses of carrying out environmental legislation6 and
60. A formal resolution, flowing from a five-year study of the "contribution of Criminal
Law to Protection of the Environment" by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe, proposed a number of provisions for consideration and possible adoption by mem-
ber states. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, FINAL ACTIVITY REPORT ON THE CONTRIBUnTION OF
CRIMINAL LAW TO PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE ON
CRIME PROBLEMS, No. CD/PC (77)3 at 1 (1977). See also EUROPEAN COMMrrra ON
CRIME PROBLEMS, COUNCIL OF EUROPE ACTIVITIES IN TIlE FIELD OF CRIME PROBLEMS 39-
40 (1977).
61. The discovery ofmercury in the effluents ofseveral Michigan businesses in 1970 led
to the passage of the so-called "Truth in Pollution" bill. The declared intent of the bill was
"to require the registration of manufacturing products, production materials and waste
products where certain wastes are discharged: [and] to provide for surveillance fees upon
discharges to the waters of the state in order to provide for investigation, monitoring and
surveillance necessary to prevent and abate water pollution.... ." Pub. Act No. 200, 1970
Regular Session, Section 1, amending the title of Michigan's water pollution control law,
codified as MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 323.13 (1975). As the law clearly declares, the pur-
pose of Michigan's surveillance fee is to fund increased monitoring. As such. it is in the
nature of a user fee. Section 323.13(d) additionally provides that fees be progressive on the
basis of volume and strength of the discharge.
This provision has led some to speak of surveillance fees as "disincentives:' Michigan's
surveillance fees are, however, essentially a vehicle for funding increased monitoring. The
monies so collected are earmarked for inspections and laboratory testing, and the like. They
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the encouragement or discouragement of types of conduct deemed to
be positive or negative from the viewpoint of the common good.62 The
principal incentive device is the accelerated write-off for pollution con-
trol facilities and the principal disincentive device consists of effluent
and related pollution charges.63
Any discussion of the categories of enforcement and mechanisms
must necessarily and finally direct itself toward the question of volun-
tary restraints. This discussion has focused primarily on the formal au-
thority of central government and its related subunits to enforce
environmental controls. But in order to fully appreciate the enforce-
ment process, it is now necessary to look behind the legal power itself
and briefly review the objectives toward which this power is normally
directed. One can argue that the raison d'etre of central government
enforcement action is ultimately to force polluters to cease and desist
through government legal action or the threat thereof. Further, the no-
tion that self-regulation and the profit motive are necessarily antitheti-
cal leads to the proposition that only significant government
intervention will effectively ensure environmental quality. In a free
market economy, it is readily assumed that a conflict will exist between
a producer's self-interest and environmental standards, whether inter-
nally set by industry or imposed by government guidelines. None of
these assumptions is sound.
First, it can be said of every jurisdiction that all environmental
control agencies, whether central government, regional or local, are
obliged to recognize that legal proceedings against corporate entities
and individuals can never serve as the principal aim of a compliance
program. Judicial proceedings take a phenomenal toll in government
resources from the standpoint of money and personnel expended. No
were the subject of a study by the United States Environmental Protection Agency as possi-
ble models for other United States jurisdictions to supplement their budgets in lieu of fed-
eral air and water program 'funding. See EPA Explores User Fee System as Means of
Financing Pollution ControlAgencies, [1974] 5 ENVIR. REP. CAsES 277 (BNA).
62. On the affirmative side are grants, rebates or reductions of taxes ordinarily collec-
tive, ie., a fiscal incentive discouraging activities deemed environmentally harmful, Taxes,
while sometimes having mixed characteristics, Le., inducing certain behavior, on the one
hand, and raising revenue on the other, are distinct from disincentives in that the former
have revenue-raising functions. See generally Irwin & Liroff, Economic Disincentivesfor
Pollution Controk Legal Political andAdmnistrative Dimensions (Environmental Protection
Agency Rep. No. EPA-600/5-74-026, July 1974).
63. For a review of fiscal approaches to environmental quality, see Zalob, Tax Incen-
tivesfor Pollution Control, INT'L TAX REP. Feb. 21, 1977, at 7.
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governmental authority has sufficient resources to pursue more than a
fraction of cases which could be litigated. Additionally, the results of
judicial proceedings and formal hearings cannot easily be predicted so
that there is often inconsistent enforcement because the acceptable
standard is not clearly delineated. Thus in the area of environmental
law as in other fields of law, enforcement must be predicated on volun-
tary conduct to achieve the stated purpose. The Toxic Substances Con-
trol Act (1976) in the United States requires the administration to
promulgate rules to assure that manufacturers maintain records and
submit such reports as are reasonably necessary, including a listing of
health and safety studies conducted by or for the manufacturer.6 4
Nonetheless, the fact that administrative agencies must rely on volun-
tary restraints should not cloud the fact that the success of environmen-
tal schemes may well hinge upon the efficacy of the enforcement
agency in prosecuting violations.
Second, there is a strong incentive for internal regulation by indus-
try itself. Industry views increased legislation and regulation as some-
thing to be averted. The principal objection of industry members to
further legislation and regulation is the potentially rigid interpretation
and uneven application of the rules which might ensue. Industry will
normally pressure its own members to reach some kind of association
standard so as to discourage outside regulation. With the exception of
Ireland, the English environmental regulatory system relies in greater
degree than any other European Economic Community member upon
a series of complex, non-legislative, intra-industry standards for envi-
ronmental protection. Despite minimal environmental legislation,
there exists in England a comprehensive web of regulation within the
institutional setting of industry itself. Where internal industrial regula-
tions are deemed insufficient to respond to the public interest, legisla-
tion will be necessary to control environmental abuses.6S
Finally, the general dependence on informal negotiations in pref-
erence to legal proceedings is clearly evidenced in the pattern of en-
forcement activities which has emerged in those jurisdictions which
have sophisticated environmental control systems.66 While compliance
64. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2607(a)(1) (1976). Other specific data as
to which reporting may be required is listed in 15 U.S.C. § 2606(a)(2). Small producers (a
category still to be defined by the EPA) are exempt from these reporting duties except as
specifically required by the Administrator. Id. at § 2607(a)(3).
65. The British environmental regulatory set-up may be divided into four tiers: individ-
ual industry standards, standards of industrial associations and/or the British Standards
Institute (BSI), the Codes of Practice, and law and regulations promulgated thereunder.
66. In the United Kingdom, for example, the Pesticides Safety Precautions Scheme
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must generally rely on voluntary action, such voluntary compliance has
the important effect on preventing environmental hazards and ulti-
mately degradation before it occurs. All the available evidence points
to the fact that only through prophylactic action can there be any real-
istic hope of reaching and sustaining the objective of a clean and decent
environment. For example, many local jurisdictions employ a permit
scheme to ensure that new construction will comply with antipollution
regulations. Permits can be an effective tool, though they are no better
than the standards they are designed to carry through. Planning and
zoning controls also can be and have been used effectively to prevent
both air and water pollution.67
V. CONCLUSION
Everywhere today, the entire enforcement effort is in a transitional
stage. There have been notable successes and corresponding failures.
Compliance with environmental standards depends on a large number
of interrelated factors, both governmental and nongovernmental. But
the major supervisory responsibility rests with central government au-
thorities because it is only at that level where controls over uniformity
and fairness can be sensibly maintained.
Stricter, more even enforcement is a necessary adjunct to existing
environmental law and regulation-"implementation gaps" should be
avoided. Stricter enforcement, however, constitutes a major challenge
for government and also places heavy burdens on the administrative
apparatus. One commentator, in assessing the relatively high adminis-
(PSPS) is a non-statutory but formally negotiated agreement between the government and
the pesticides industry under which manufacturers have undertaken to notify the Ministry of
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food or the Health and Safety Executive prior to marketing any
new pesticide or proposing a new use of an existing one. For a detailed overview of this and
other non-statutory controls, see Pollution Control in Great Britain.- How it Iorks-A Review
ofLegislative andAdministrative Procedures, POLLUToN PAPER No. 9 at 66, HMSO (1976),
In the United States as a second example, given the context of a federal system, enforcement
of particular pollution sources has been considered the province of state and local govern-
ments. With this sort of deference to state and local control, the primary idea embodied in
federal enforcement has been to prod the state and local units into action. The state and
local agencies, in turn, and quite apart from formal legal proceedings, do their own prod-
ding. The enforcement relationship as described is declared as congressional policy in two
principal pollution acts. The Clean Air Act states: "That the prevention and control of air
pollution at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local government," and
similar language appears in the Water Pollution Control Act. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 7401(a)(3) (Supp. 1979), and Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (Supp.
1979).
67. See Rydell & Schwarz, Air Pollution and Urban Form: A Review of Current Litera.
ture, 34 J. Am. INST. OF PLANNERS 115 (1968).
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trative costs of toxic substances legislation in the United States, has
stated:
Finally, it should be recognized that the intensive regulation of one
industrial sector, as by the Toxic Substances Control Act, represents
an expenditure of governmental resources which might alternatively
have been applied in a less rigorous form for a broader scope of envi-
ronmental risks.
68
Although the general framework of environmental control is set at the
executive levels of central government, the basic issues of standard-
setting and compliance, which may be generated outside of central gov-
ernment, will determine the degree to which environmental degrada-
tion is controlled.
The next few years will indicate whether existing environmental
legislation and current enforcement techniques can bring about a sig-
nificant improvement in environmental quality or whether still more
stringent efforts are needed. There may well be a stepped up use of
criminal and civil penalties both in terms of character and degree and a
corresponding cutting back on voluntary compliance schemes. Cer-
tainly there exist the statutory tools in many jurisidictions which give
central government the framework within which it can pursue direct
enforcement against individual violators. Where the regions and local-
ities are increasingly inadequate to the task, we may well anticipate
that enforcement will steadily and most surely become a central gov-
ernment function. Moreover, national administrations should increas-
ingly recognize that the environment versus development conundrum is
in fact a non-issue6 9 and that lax enforcement and the associated imple-
mentation gaps must ultimately be squarely confronted and resolved in
favor of continuing meaningful environmental controls.
68. Mattes, Premarket Testing of Industrial Products--A leans of Controlling Unrecog-
nized Environmental Hazards, IUCN ENVT'L POL'Y & L PAPER No. 13 (1977).
69. For a rebuttal of the general "growth versus environment" argument, see Editorial,
2 ENV'L PoL'y & L. 49 (1976).
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